Journal of Undergraduate Research at
Minnesota State University, Mankato
Volume 11

Article 12

2011

"They Are just Like Us": The 1960 Winter Olympics and U.S.-Soviet
Relations
Joe Schiller
Minnesota State University, Mankato

Follow this and additional works at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur
Part of the Political History Commons, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons, and the Sports
Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Schiller, Joe (2011) ""They Are just Like Us": The 1960 Winter Olympics and U.S.-Soviet Relations," Journal
of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato: Vol. 11 , Article 12.
Available at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol11/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research Center at Cornerstone: A
Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato by an authorized editor of
Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato.

Schiller: "They Are just Like Us": The 1960 Winter Olympics and U.S.-Soviet

“They Are Just Like Us”: The 1960 Winter Olympics and U.S.-Soviet Relations
Joe Schiller (Department of History)
Matthew Loayza, Faculty Mentor (Department of History)
My research examined American attitudes towards the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc
at the 1960, Squaw Valley Winter Olympics. This includes the press’ prevailing attitude in its
depictions of American and western European athletes, versus those of Eastern European
athletes. Parallels between these and the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Games are of especial import;
a Cold War era Olympics, on American soil, pitting American capitalism against Soviet
communism, where the underdog Americans score an ice hockey victory over the Soviets en
route to a gold medal. In 1980 the ice hockey competition was highly politicized, and historians
have devoted increasing attention to how nation states have used sport as a means of justifying
national ideologies. Yet in 1960, the same result met little fanfare, and no attention from
historians. My research also examined the American government’s attitudes towards Soviet
Russia to help explain this disconnect. I found that the Soviet Union was at this time making a
concerted effort, through diplomacy and sport, to be more conciliatory to the U.S. The American
public and government recognized this, and the generally harmonious spirit of the ‘60 Winter
Games is attributable to this fact. The political environment surrounding these games, then,
allowed them to be played only in the sporting arena, and not as much in the political arena. This
research is based on relevant secondary monographs and articles which explore the rise of
international, state-driven sport beginning with the modern Olympics; sport and international
politics in the 20th Century, especially as it pertains to competition between and among
capitalism, communism, and fascism; the importance of pageantry and glorification to competing
and hosting Olympic nations; the 1980 Olympic hockey competition, and nationalistic bias in
Olympic figure skating judging. It is also based on examination of government documents, the
Final Report of the VIII Winter Olympic Games, and a variety of contemporary newspapers and
mass-circulation magazines such as Sports Illustrated and Time.
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Entering the third and final period of the Olympic gold medal ice hockey game in 1960 at
Squaw Valley, California, the United States trailed Czechoslovakia 4-3, when an unlikely visitor
appeared in the U.S. locker room. Soviet captain Nikolai Sologubov entered to encourage the
Americans and suggest that they take whiffs of oxygen, as the Soviets had during their games
during the tournament, to combat the strictures of the mile-high air. All scientific refutation of
oxygen’s benefits aside, the American side exploded for six third-period goals to win its first ice
hockey gold medal, 9-4. But the act transcends hockey, raising important questions about U.S.
and Soviet relations in their Cold War context. Certainly, the Americans questioned whether
Captain Nik was motivated more by Olympian ideals and athletic amity or by the desire to keep
their hated Czech rivals from winning. But given the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, Sologubov’s support of a Cold War enemy over a fellow communist nation is
surprising.
This episode appeared in the newspapers the next day and was mentioned in passing by
such outlets as Sports Illustrated, but few commentators, then or now, devoted serious thought to
the implications of Sologubov’s gesture. The act was part of a larger shift in American relations
with the Soviet Union, or more appropriately, vice versa. In the years leading to 1960 the Soviet
Union was making a concerted effort to appear conciliatory to the U.S. and mitigate Cold War
tensions. The Soviet athletic machinery was complicit, as early as 1958, until immediately
following the games, attempting to appear friendlier to the West than at any time since the Cold
War began.
Since the 1970s and 1980s, historians have effectively demonstrated that close study of
sport is a worthy lens to view how organized sport relates or reflects societal values on global
neo-liberal economics, diplomacy and war, cultural globalization, the construction of national
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identity, and media. Many of these topics, to be sure, mark a tangent from sport and international
relations, but international relations have seldom been scholars’ first priority. Until recently this
literature has predominantly been written by specialists in history, law, sports studies, and
especially sociology, but not international relations.1
Scholars of international relations traditionally concern themselves with formal bilateral
relations between nation states that can most easily be subsumed under “politics.” As historians
Levermore and Budd assert, academic scholarship and common discourse on the topic have
tended to place the international sphere in a sort of impersonal “no man’s land,” hanging in the
air between states.2 By focusing upon issues related to national security, military affairs, and
diplomacy—“high politics”—scholars of foreign relations have overlooked some of the equally
important interactions between peoples of different countries including, but certainly not limited
to organized sport.
Few Americans have the good fortune (if it should be called good) to experience their
nation’s foreign relations firsthand. Nearly all, however, have the means to participate in or
observe amateur or professional sport. Indeed, “Most Americans know more about sports than
they do about politics, science, religion, or their own Constitution,”3 usually much more. While
many tend to avoid discussing politics and other controversial subjects in the workplace and
many social settings, debating sport is welcomed and encouraged. Even in the context of bitter
local or regional rivalry, sport can be openly discussed without risking much more than minor
injuries to the combatants’ pride. It transcends class, race, and often sexuality and gender. As
Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd, “Sport and International Relations: Continued Neglect?” in Sport and
International Relations: An Emerging Relationship eds. Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd. (New York: Routledge,
2004), 6.
2
Ibid, 8.
3
Mark Dyreson, Making the American Team: Sport, Culture, and the Olympic Experience (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1998), 1.
1
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many radio stations seem to be devoted solely to sports talk as political talk. The same can be
said for television, where several networks, such as ESPN, sports networks under the umbrellas
of Comcast and Fox, and even collegiate conference networks like that of the Big 10, are devoted
exclusively to sports. Under the guise of sports talk, Americans opine on racial, ethical, social,
and moral questions, so it should come as no surprise that scholars are devoting increasing
energy to its many manifestations. Certainly, throughout the 20th century and the early part of the
new millennium, sport has “involved more players, spectators and officials than any other social
movement.”4 It has become difficult to describe America’s fabric without mention of sport’s
place in that weave.
Sport attained its present status in large part due to the work of a loosely associated group
of American thinkers in the 19th century. As Dyreson argues, the period following Civil War
Reconstruction saw rapid modernization, and a resultant rise in industrialization, urbanization,
and immigration.
Many intellectuals and much of the public feared these changes would undermine the
stability and unity of purpose upon which the republican experiment relied. To combat these less
attractive results of modernization, a “critical mass” in American society paradoxically invented
a new technology, the “sporting republic,” to create a new national identity for the United
States.5 Sport may be considered “technology,” and thus an inventible commodity because of its
likeness to other social technology, like public school systems, or armies and navies, an
“organization of human energy designed for problem solving.”6 When one claims that sport will

James Riordan, Introduction to Sport and International Politics: The Impact of Fascism and Communism on Sport
(London: E & FN Spon, 1998), 1.
5
Dyreson, 2.
6
Ibid, 3.
4
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inculcate the values of sportsmanship, team play, and fairness, or control social deviancy and
assimilate immigrants, he uses sport as technology. This is exactly what turn-of-the 20th century
sporting republicans did.
The inventors of the sporting republic were generally northern, urban industrialists,
taking a cue, perhaps unwittingly, from their British brethren of the 19th century. These were
both elite and middle class people, some of whom had experience with sport either in college or
in local sporting clubs, and came from many strains of society; public moralists, “Eastern
Establishment” types, social reformers, municipal administrators, politicians, scientists, teachers,
professors, and a new class of athletic organizers, public health advocates, entrepreneurs, and
journalists and editors.7 They popularized the idea of the sporting republic simply by promoting
sports’ merits; that it could instill the mores and values of participation and a common sense of
purpose lost to rapid modernization, rebuilding a sense of community which they viewed as
essential to the survival of the American republican experiment. The diversity of sports’ early
adherents allowed for a broad dispersal of the message, and successive waves of advance in
transportation and communication technology—transcontinental railroad lines, mass print
media—engendered a rapid expansion in the sporting republic’s breadth and scope.
The republic was formed as a means to create a national identity, based on the above, and
what good is an identity without a mirror in which to check one’s reflection against the other
countries of the world? Additionally, defining sport as technology implies that the values the
athlete learns from sport in micro can be applied in macro to foreign relations. The sense of
community, region, and ultimately, nation is a natural progression of sport, and this was not lost
on the French Baron Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the International Olympic Committee.
7

Ibid, 20-21.
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Coubertin started the Olympic movement with “a doctrine of ‘universalism,’ which as it appears
in the most recent Olympic Charter declared that ‘any form of discrimination with regard to a
country or a person on grounds of race, religion politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible
with belonging to the Olympic Movement.’”8 In other words, Coubertin believed that fair play
on the field would engender fair play off the field. In like vein, the proponents of the sporting
republic worked on the assumption that sport could provide a moral equivalent for war, where
competition on the field, as Dyreson noted, was good enough, and could make traditional, real
war obsolete9. This notion also creates an inextricable bond between sport and nationalism,
where athletes have become proxy soldiers, representing their nation in conflicts abroad. But in
1916, the battle was real, fought by trained soldiers on the battlefield, not by athletes on the
playing field.
The advent of World War I rendered the 1916 Berlin Olympics, the sporting republic’s
most outward illustration of its virtues, impotent. It also dashed the notion that athletes had
replaced soldiers for foreign relations purposes and silenced the intellectuals and public who had
promoted sport as moral equivalent for war. Because the war catalyzed a renewed nationalism,
the importance of sport to this end was significantly minimized and prompted the collapse of the
sporting republic. The intellectuals who conceived of and upheld the idea became disenchanted
with its viability as a vehicle for social change and began to regard sport the way our present day
sporting illiterate do, as a mindless manifestation of mass culture.10
Although the decline of the sporting republic was very real, sport itself became
increasingly popular and increasingly politicized as the century progressed. Where it had perhaps
Chris Berg, “Politics, Not Sport, is the Purpose of the Olympic Games,” IPA Review (July 2008), 15.
Dyreson, 199.
10
Ibid, 202
8
9
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lost some moral and ethical weight, sport did not simply shrink from the American
consciousness but instead revealed itself to be highly marketable and profitable for entrepreneurs
after the Great War. This meant capitalizing on sport in an urban culture driven by a consumer
base which embraced professional sport as a spectator, leisure activity. This trend, to be sure,
only removed any moral heft it still carried.11 Sport as a social technology had given way to sport
as a consumer product. This will be visible throughout the 20th century and its many and varied
interpretations of amateurism.
A business writer who frequently touches on the Olympic Games, John Milton-Smith
ably applies business ethics to the Olympic movement, arguing that our present-day
disillusionment with compromised Olympic virtues mirrors the trend in business whereby
society has become disenchanted with the latent effects of globalization—a win at any cost
attitude, commercial exploitation by multi-national corporations, national rivalry, corruption, and
the relative disparity of states’ competitive advantages. He also states that our modern Games are
based on anachronism: that “The idea that amateur sport is both the key to individual moral
development and world harmony is largely an invention of the British aristocracy.”12 An
American invention too, as we have seen.
Art critic and historian Michael Mackenzie uses artist Leni Riefenstahl’s propagandistic
film, Olympia, on the 1936 “Nazi Games,” to prove the importance of sport to politics in that era.
The Nazi regime was faced with a difficult situation when it inherited the Olympics from the
Weimar Republic with its ascendancy to power in Germany. The party’s ideology rejected the

Ibid.
John Milton-Smith, “Ethics, The Olympics and the Search for Global Values,” Journal of Business Ethics 35.2
(January 2002), 131.

11
12
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Olympic movement for its “internationalism and pacifism,” putting the games in doubt.13 Instead
of cancelling the games though, the Nazis resolved to put on the most lavish games to date,
showcasing German achievement and setting a standard for nationalistic one-upmanship in
Olympic pageantry which thrives today. They apparently invented the modern torch relay in
order to “ferry Western journalists around idyllic German villages, in support of the Nazi’s rural
ideology.”14 The Nazis also could use this platform to showcase its fusion of sport and politics,
whereby sport held social import for the purposes of health and wellness.
The Olympic and political historian Christopher R. Hill’s title, “Keeping Politics in
Sport,” is a clear admission and assumption that the two are inextricably linked. Just before the
1996 Atlanta summer games opened, he raised the interesting point that although the IOC could
have made a compelling and logical case for awarding the centenary Olympics to Athens, the
original site of the modern Games, they instead chose Atlanta, “the home of CNN, Coca-Cola
and the Atlanta Braves.”15 This trend toward commercialization had emerged during and after
WWI just as the idea of the sporting republic declined. According to Hill, the real politicization
of the modern Olympics is a matter of recognition. The International Olympic Committee’s
balance between universalism and the too-generous acceptance of malevolent or peripheral states
has caused this crisis of acceptance. This is the case of the two Chinas, two Germanys and two
Koreas in the period following World War II, battling for the legitimacy that the IOC’s
recognition lends to a state. Whichever one gains acceptance by the IOC becomes the “real”
China, “real” Germany, or “real” Korea. This is paramount to nations not so that their athletes

Michael Mackenzie, “From Athens to Berlin: The 1936 Olympics and Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympia,” Critical Inquiry
29.2 (Winter 2003), 302.
14
Berg, 17.
15
Christopher R. Hill, “Keeping Politics in Sports,” The World Today 52.7 (July 1996), 192.
13
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may participate, but so that the nation itself may capitalize on the commercial profitability of the
Games, and the political recognition as a member of the world order, the Olympic movement.
Foreign relations specialist Allen Guttmann studies “The Cold War and the Olympics,”
paying special attention to the 1980 U.S. boycott of the Moscow Summer Games, and the
subsequent Soviet retaliation by refusing to attend the ‘84 Los Angeles Summer games. Guttman
argues that the Cold War rivalry is “one of the most dramatic aspects of the modern Olympics,”
and that “propagandists on both sides of the Iron Curtain have presented the competition…as a
portentous symbolic struggle between two ideological systems.”16 The Soviet Union’s bid to join
the International Olympic Committee, Guttman notes, strained the IOC’s doctrine of
universalism, as many Western Olympic Committees were reluctant to accept the bid. Most
important, according to Guttmann, was not ideology, but behavior, for the incident that led to the
boycotts was not really ideological, but tactical: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979.
Historian Donald Abelson explores this intersection of Olympic sport and politics more
acutely, using the 1980 “Miracle on Ice” at Lake Placid, New York as a lens. During the 1980
Winter Games, the United States ice hockey team met the Soviet team in the medal round. This
match pitted the Americans, composed primarily of collegiate level players, against a seasoned,
veteran Soviet squad that many experts believed to be the best hockey team the world had ever
seen. While most of the American players were only near twenty years of age, some of the
Soviet players were competing in their third Olympic tournament. The underdog Americans beat
the Soviet juggernaut on their way to the gold medal. It is regarded by many as the greatest
American sporting moment of the 20th century. Abelson delves into the Cold War rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union, examining the way in which the event was
16

Allen Guttman, “The Cold War and the Olympics,” International Journal 43.4 (Autumn 1988), 554.
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“catapulted from the hockey arena to the political arena.”17 He calls attempts by American
politicians, notably President Jimmy Carter, to capitalize on the popularity of the hockey team,
as blatant opportunism. Yet he recognizes the ease with which any competition between the
superpowers was politicized during the Cold War, and that of them all, this was probably most
captivating, and therefore the political opportunism comes as no surprise.18
This study examines the 1960 Squaw Valley Olympic Winter Games in light of several
important, converging interests, such as the intersection of entrepreneurship and the games,
manifest in one real estate developer and his Sierra Mountain Resort; the lure of pageantry,
nationalism, and glory bestowed on the host nation; Soviet-American Cold War rivalry, and the
prevailing attitudes of American media and the public toward this engagement; questions of
amateurism and the future of the Olympic movement, of especial interest to one IOC President,
Avery Brundage. All of these predict themes of our modern sporting and Olympic landscape,
where nations use the Games to upgrade infrastructure and showcase their thriving economy in
fits of nationalism, like China in 2008, and bodies like the NCAA wrestle with definitions of
amateurism in light especially of college athletic recruiting violations and untoward payments to
athletes.
Over the course of eleven days in February 1960, the VIII Olympiad descended upon a
little-known resort town in the California Sierra Nevada, near Lake Tahoe. An American
maverick named Alec Cushing had, thanks to shrewd business sense and financing from the
California legislature, seemingly swindled the games from deserving European locales, which
led purist observers to call for an end to the Winter Games altogether for their bastardizations of
Donald E. Abelson, “Politics on Ice: The United States, the Soviet Union, and a Hockey Game in Lake Placid,”
Canadian Review of American Studies 40.1 (2010), 63.
18
Ibid, 89.
17
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amateurism. The Soviets were making only their second appearance at the Winter Games, on
American soil, no less, and they reaped an impressive haul in the final “unofficial” medal count,
significant given the efforts of both superpowers to use those counts to showcase the superiority
of their respective systems. The Cold War was about a decade in progress, each side feeling out
the exigencies of this uncomfortable arrangement. The United States crafted an unlikely upset of
the Soviets in ice hockey, en route to the first American gold medal in that sport. These were the
final Olympic Games before those that, as Maraniss claims, “changed the world,”19 but that does
not mean they were of a different, earlier era, but rather puts them on the cusp of the Olympic
movement as we know it. Television and print coverage of the games was burgeoning. The
forces which allow Maraniss to anoint the 1960 Rome Summer Games as those that changed the
world were largely in motion by the time the athletes departed Squaw Valley. It is possible that
the only factor holding them back from a similar anointing is the diminished scope of the sports
included on the winter card, relative to their summer counterparts.
The increasing commercialization of amateur competition, which came at the expense of
the idealized sporting republic, is central to the 1960 Winter Games even finding a home at
Squaw Valley. In 1955, a former New York law clerk, Alec Cushing, flying by the seat of his
pants, “out-talked Aspen, Lake Placid, and Reno’s Ski Bowl to win the nomination…as
America’s candidate for 1960,”20 despite the fact that his resort had been open less than six
years and was his first venture of the kind. From there, Cushing revved his “steam roller to get
the games,”21 touring every international winter sporting event he could reach—at the 1955
world bobsled championships at St. Moritz he secured the ‘58 event in that sport for his own

David Maraniss, Rome 1960: The Olympics that Changed the World (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2008).
David Hulburd, “Bonanza in Squaw Valley,” Sports Illustrated, July 11, 1955.
21
Ibid.
19
20
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resort, which at that time lacked a bobsled run! The international contacts Cushing made in such
travels helped him duplicate his USOC speaking success when he took his presentation to the
International Olympic Committee.
Although World War I dashed hopes that sport could replace war, the notion that sport
could stand as war’s moral equivalent survived the sporting republic left after its demise was the
culture of international competition fostered by the idea of sport as moral equivalent for war.
Though two world wars had significantly undermined the sporting republic’s moral footing, the
competition it encouraged, if unintentionally, remained. But sport was not the only arena for this
competition. It also played out in the kitchen. At the 1959 American National Exhibition in
Moscow, then Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev displayed
this innate ability of the two sides to compete in virtually anything. On the opening day of the
exhibition the two dignitaries traded verbal barbs, especially with regard to the display of a
prototypical American kitchen. Khrushchev dismissed the model kitchen as propaganda, alleging
that not every American could afford such appliances and furnishings as appeared in the
exhibit—microwave, dishwasher, refrigerator, and other small appliances. Nixon countered that
the kitchen was that of a $14,000 home, one which even striking U.S. steel workers could easily
afford. The stubborn Khrushchev only implicitly acknowledged the merits of Western
technology by asserting that “in another seven years we will be on the same level as America.”22
The “kitchen debate” illustrates the lengths to which the superpowers would go to compete.
The model kitchen reflected the confidence and prosperity of postwar America, an age
that witnessed new material comforts, allowed for the construction of an interstate highway

Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St.
Martin’s, 1997), 179.

22
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system, and the rapid construction of suburbs filled with two-car garages. The federal budget was
at an all-time, peacetime high; we developed a vaccine against polio, and enacted civil rights
legislation for the first time since Reconstruction.23 Regarding the Soviet Union, it was safe for
the American public and government to assume it had a technological advantage over the
Russians.
That perception was seriously undermined on 4 October 1957, when the Soviets launched
the first artificial satellite into orbit, Sputnik. Sputnik caused “a sudden crisis of confidence in
American technology, values, politics, and the military.”24 Americans assumed the link between
space travel capabilities and security; the side which mastered space flight first would have the
upper hand in delivering lethal weapons to enemy targets and in this race, the U.S. had lost the
first leg. Sputnik created a perception of American political weakness, complacency, and the idea
of a “missile gap,” which would become a Cold War buzzword for comparison.25 Sputnik,
perhaps more than any other event of the Cold War, became the catalyst for Soviet-American
competition. It spurred the United States to place high priority on scientific development and
research, pumping massive amounts of money and human energy into closing the perceived
technological gap or create a situation of advantage to use our desired superiority as a diplomatic
tool. Sputnik touched even those Americans well removed from technology industries by
changing the way they viewed their values of conspicuous consumption. Many believed the
nation was wasting its talents on the frivolities of consumer goods and image, and that

Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Walker, 2001), 3-4.
Ibid, 4.
25
Ibid, 5.
23
24
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Americans had best focus on the global competition with the Soviets rather than on keeping up
with the Joneses in our subdivisions.26
This by-product of the sporting republic—competition in any arena—would play out in
any Cold War sporting event between the superpowers, and the 1960 Games were only the
second Winter Olympics for the Soviet Union. This research will explore the prevailing current
of U.S. journalism around the Squaw Valley 1960 Winter Games, its attitude toward the Easternbloc “other,” and the narratives that mass publication magazines and newspapers promoted to the
American public. It will also examine official government documents to compare these
narratives to how U.S. officials viewed the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union, to be sure, used sport as the West did, with even greater emphasis on
its potential for utilitarian purposes. As an assembly of sixteen ethnically, religiously, and
culturally diverse peoples, many of them illiterate, the USSR employed sport as a means of
promoting health, hygiene, defense, labor productivity, and ethnic integration for nation
building.27 Thus sport in Russia “had the quite revolutionary role of being an agent of social
change, with the state as pilot.”28 Sport as an agent for social change was not unique—the
American sporting republic was founded on a similar premise—but U.S. sport was run under the
auspices of bodies like the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), “the most important national
sporting organization of the period.”29 In contrast, Soviet sport was directed by the state to a far
greater degree.

Ibid, 4.
Jim Riordan, “The Impact of Communism on Sport,” in The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century, eds.
Jim Riordan and Arnd Kruger (London: E&FN Spon, 1999), 49.
28
Ibid.
29
Dyreson, 21.
26
27
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The official American stance toward and public perception of the Soviet position are also
important to examine with regard to the strict foreign relations issues between the powers. As
early as 1956, the U.S. was exploring the possibility of expanding its admissions policy for
members of the Soviet Bloc seeking travel in the states, and even initiating an exchange program
for large numbers of students. This seems to mark the beginning of rather friendly relations
between the two, but even this gesture was couched, at least privately, in terms of competition.
Admitting larger numbers of Soviet Bloc nationals “would tend to maintain the reputation of the
U.S as a mature leader and as a believer in freedom,”30 countering Communist propaganda. The
State Department and the Soviet leadership, diplomatically, stated that each side had much to
learn from the other, but each assumed that he had more to gain from the relationship to gain a
competitive advantage.
Although the Soviet Union was generally receptive to the proposed exchanges, their
intervention in the Hungarian revolution brought these initiatives to an early end. Still, relations
did not collapse. Instead, as the 1950s progressed, a similar sort of measured conciliation
continued, where the outward effort was toward harmony, but certain actions placed that
harmony in jeopardy. By early 1958 the American government was aware of public Soviet
displays of goodwill. In January of that year, Soviet leadership announced a 300,000 man
reduction in armed forces, as “part of developing campaign to demonstrate Soviet desires for
relaxation of tensions and to encourage Western tendencies toward slowing down military
preparations and toward new negotiations with USSR.”31 This was well-intentioned, but the
Americans recognized that the announcements were also an attempt to encourage a reduction in
Statement of Policy on Admission to the U.S. of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable
Under Existing Law, March 26, 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1955-1957 XXIV: 202.
31
Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European
Regional Organizations, January 9, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960 X: 146.
30

https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol11/iss1/12

16

Schiller: "They Are just Like Us": The 1960 Winter Olympics and U.S.-Soviet

kind, so that the U.S. would not maximize its technological advantage but maintain balance with
the Soviet Union. Additionally, many U.S. officials doubted that this reduction was a true net
reduction in force, as advances in technology could allow for a human reduction, while actually
maintaining military strength.32 When Nikita Khrushchev assumed the Premiership around the
time of the manpower reduction announcement, he concentrated power over the Communist
party and the Soviet government in one seat for the first time since Stalin’s death, further raising
concerns in Washington about the Soviets’ underlying motives. Moreover, goodwill gestures did
not mean the end of Cold War espionage, and American suspicions of Soviet intentions led to
numerous violations of Soviet airspace in the late 1950s, with the Soviets calling for their end,
and the U.S. publicly decrying them too. Their continued occurrence, however, especially the
initiation of the U2 program which would takeover headlines shortly after Squaw Valley, points
to a less than harmonious attitude on the part of the Americans.
The official Soviet attitude toward sport and to the United States during the period
leading to the Squaw Valley Winter Games lends credence to the possibility that the athletes may
have been the mouthpieces for national policy, regardless of the official nature of that position.
Their interaction with American journalism confirms as much. In 1958 the Soviet national
hockey team toured the U.S. in advance of the Olympics. Despite unfortunate travel
circumstances, which brought the Soviets to New York two days later than planned, and with
less practice and assimilation time than hoped for, the players and their coach, Anatoly Tarasov
were profusely respectful and complementary of their hosts. Tarasov expressed that they did not
want to delay the game, for fear of disappointing the ticket holders. He also said that “Except for
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the lack of practice ice we have been treated with great hospitality.”33 But most to the point when
we consider the Soviet diplomatic efforts, Tarasov went so far as to state, “The outcome of the
game is secondary to our primary purpose here, which is to promote more friendly relations with
the United States.”34 In the context of the Cold War, and the importance placed on clashes
between the powers, these statements are noteworthy for their complete denial of the desire to
win the game. They do, however, state the national effort at friendship with the United States.
During the Games and after, these sentiments continued. The anecdote which opens this
article is one; the captain of the Soviet ice hockey team inexplicably (or not) gave a tip to the
Americans to spur them on to a gold medal victory, but the rules of the Olympic hockey
tournament in 1960 was structured such that the final game was not a true gold medal game. If
Czechoslovakia had beaten the U.S., the Czechs would not have won the gold, but they would
have finished ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the final standings. This fact, which the Americans
recognized, is probably what encouraged Nikolai Sologubov to aid the Americans more than
anything. Still, the Associated Press wire photo of Sologubov in the center of, and intertwining
arms with U.S. coach Jack Riley and American players is telling.35 His ear-to-ear smile is,
however, not Russian at all in the earlier sense of that archetype.
The American press did not fail to recognize such displays. Sports Illustrated’s Roy
Terrell, especially drawn to Soviet speed skating champion Evgeni Grishin summarized the
events in a post-Games article: “[The Soviets] have become more human….Suddenly, at Squaw
Valley, the Russians ceased to be muscles without minds or personalities and became
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individuals.”36 Though Terrell admitted this, in a recurring theme of U.S. journalism, he would
also get his digs at the Soviet’s system. Predictably, he asserts that “the story behind Russia’s
vast success…was…a massive sports program enveloping schools and clubs and labor unions
and the military service, state encouragement, and frequent outright aid to the specially talented,”
as well as the stereotypical belief that the Russian athletes desire victory less for themselves than
for Mother Russia.37 Indeed, International Olympic Committee president Avery Brundage, also
an American, voiced this belief as well, that “the principle, the idea, is simply this: that
sport…has definite moral virtue,” and that the Soviets recognize that.38 Yet, Terrell and other
members of the press were taken by Grishin, perhaps for such quips as, “Do I like Americans?
Of Course. They are just like us.” Grishin would go on to describe his love for automobiles as his
“sickness. I am crazy about them….I would like to race a Ford. In my dreams I race Fords, but
they always beat me. I do not have enough cylinders.”39 The American journalist’s dream: a
world-class product of the Soviet athletic machinery acknowledging American supremacy in at
least one industry!
American journalism also noticed the new Soviet woman, but this recognition tacitly
proved the existence of a previous stereotype much like that of the stoic, serious, never-smiling
Soviet man. The most visible case of this paradigm shift was in coverage of the women’s crosscountry ski event. In a fashion characteristic of the American attitude toward Eastern European
women, Terrell (again) wrote, “Maria Gusakova of Russia, an amazingly attractive girl…after
hastily applying lipstick, proceeded to charm several hundred members of a curious and
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unbelieving press.”40 The press certainly was not shocked at her victory, for she was predicted to
win before the Games opened.41 It is a wonder then, why they were so alarmed. Likely because
she was a Soviet woman who was beautiful, and applied lipstick before facing the press. Little
doubt exists that their reaction would have been different if dealing with an American female
athlete.
In fact, when it comes to depictions of American women, beauty was much more likely
to be the topic of conversation, especially if she happened to be successful in competition. Such
is the case of American figure skater and gold medalist Carol Heiss, who was described as “20year old Carol Heiss, a pert and lovely girl from Ozone, N.Y., thrilled the crowd with a
breathtaking set of free figures.”42 This description, representative of the journalism covering the
ladies figure skating competition, is from what should be the most objective, bland description of
the Games’ events, the official Final Report of the VIII Olympic Winter Games, 1960! These
descriptions magnify Heiss’ virginal purity and beauty—she won, it seems, because of these
traits, not because she was a superior athlete.
Women of the Western camp received similar coverage to that of Heiss. Here they are
juxtaposed against another attractive Russian, speed skater Lydia Skoblikova, who had “deep
dimples in her cheeks…blue eyes and blond hair—which, however, is much shorter and curlier
than [American skier] Penny [Pitou’s]. In her tight racing costume, she appears very trim.”43 The
“however” which sets off her comparison to Pitou makes it as if her shorter, curlier hair keeps
her from being as beautiful as Pitou. In this case, however, the descriptions of women are better
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described as general objectifications of women rather than efforts to magnify East-West
differences. The article goes on to describe, again, Heiss’ “beauty and brilliance,”44 and also the
Canadian slalom champion, Anne Heggtveit, “a slender blonde from Ottawa.”45 Even when
asked about the technical aspects of her Olympic preparations she was subjected to a physical
description, “‘was late getting to my peak,’ she explained, with her nice smile”46 (emphasis
mine). This illustrates a type of treatment virtually never given to male athletes when describing
their events.
In male competition, the press trained its focus more strictly on the playing field—or in
the case of ice hockey, on the ice rink. Nevertheless, media descriptions conveyed Cold War
narratives and depictions of the Soviet “other” to the reading public. In hockey, notable for its
propensity for collective behavior as a team sport, the Soviet team took on the characteristics
typically associated with Soviet individuals. Accounts of their style invariably tend toward their
“precise teamwork,”47 again from the Final Report of the Games, put out by the American
organizing group for Squaw Valley. The Russian team is depicted a hockey behemoth, seeming
“even stronger than it was at Cortina (1956 Winter Games), where it won all seven of its games,
scoring 40 goals and conceding only nine.”48 The 1960 version, of course, “skates fast and well
and passes with notable precision.” Hockey became the perfect venue for extending the machinelike Cold War stereotype for the Soviet Union. Significantly, the U.S. government recognized
that in industry and technology, too, the Soviets had become stronger since 1956.49
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Americans could further undermine Russian hockey supremacy in particular and ideology
in general, through discussions of the Olympics’ primary ideals, internationalism and
amateurism. While the American press’ treatment of the athletes was becoming more balanced
around the Squaw Valley Games, debates about amateurism on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain
became more contentious. Gladwin Hill decried the perceived decay of Olympic virtue in The
New York Times, especially taking the Soviets to task for their sporting system. When he
criticized “The ‘unofficial’ nation-by-nation point-scoring” that had eclipsed “personal
exploits,”50 it is doubtful he had Italy and her one bronze medal in mind. The medal count Hill
referred to was a misappropriation of the “internationalist” ideal—internationalism was an
Olympic pillar for the Baron de Coubertin not so that nations could establish rivalries and prove
what nation was best, but for the triumph of the individual on the world stage. Internationalism
meant only that all were welcome in the Olympic Movement, not that the Games were a
competition between national contingents. While Hill may have had the relatively successful
American team in mind, he most certainly placed the Soviet Union first, for its world-leading
medal count in the first two Winter Games in which it participated. Fittingly, Hill cited the
brochures that Russian athletes distributed at the Games which stated “that athletic achievements
were ‘rare’ in Czarist Russia, while ‘Soviet power has helped the people to unfold their talents in
every field of human activity, sports including [sic].’”51 To Hill this was clearly an affront to the
Olympic ideal of internationalism, in the sense that it had meant the acceptance of all creeds and
ideologies, with no meddling or propaganda. Hill also attacked the Soviet notion of amateurism
as fraudulent, complaining that “In the official Olympic biographies, an occasional Russian is
cryptically listed as a “worker” or an “employe”[sic]. But for many others the sole pursuit given is
Gladwin Hill, “The Haunted Valley: A Suggestion That Olympic Ideals Have Become Wandering Specters,” New
York Times, February 27, 1960.
51
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“member of the National Hockey Team.”52 This is the way the American public could infer
something of the Soviet “other” and his ideology.
That narrative contrasts with that provided for consumption of the American hockey
team, our societal representative in miniature. The coverage of the hockey tournament at the
Games was relatively objective. Little direct comparison exists between the two teams—usually
they are described separately and of their own merit. Any real value judgments then, must be
inferred. That judgment was implied when William Leggett summed up the hockey tournament
for Sports Illustrated, stating that the Soviets and Canadians had come in as the favorites, but
few paid attention to a third team, the United States, “Our Never-Say-Die Hockeymen,” to
borrow his headline.53 This team “included a soldier, a fireman, a couple of carpenters, two
insurance peddlers and a television advertising salesman.”54 While their humble day jobs are of
some significance to playing the squad as an underdog for journalism’s sake, the reader will
invariably draw a comparison to the soviets and their quasi-professional hockey team. As usual,
the author goes on to say that the Americans seemed no match for “Russia, with its marvelous
pattern passing and tight defense,”55 both of which are part of their “otherness” as the serious,
precise machine with great structure.
The American public could infer a few things about its own athletes and those of the
Eastern Bloc from journalism around the 1960 Olympic Winter Games at Squaw Valley. First,
from Soviet athletes stating that their goals here were to promote better relations with the U.S.,
and Soviet athletes giving Americans a competitive advantage, and endearing individuals like
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speed skaters Evgeni Grishin and Lydia Skoblikova, the American reading public could feel the
change that had occurred on the individual and collective level between 1956 and 1960, which
Roy Terrell had hinted at.
Secondly, that recognition of a “new” Soviet did not mark a brand-new relationship
between the two powers. In other words, Cold War rivalry continued. The climate for
competition was too great, as indicated by something seemingly trivial like the “kitchen
debates.” Appropriately, the Soviets were forced to balance a fine line in their statements after
the Games closed. As has been established, they were at the time seeking to improve relations
with the U.S., but they were also bitterly disappointed, especially by their hockey team’s
performance. They were probably the nation which used sport as a national identity more than
any other, America included. This showed in reports that reached the American press from the
Soviet Union, praising the United States for the Games’ hospitable atmosphere: “The only sour
note came in discussing the Soviet Union’s disappointing hockey team, which lost to the United
States and Canada and finished third.”56 The Soviet official quoted in the article said, “Our
hockey team lacked in technique and it will have to do a lot of work when it returns
home….although superior in play often proved unable to wind up attacks successfully.”57 Failure
was hard to swallow for a nation whose national identity was so inextricably linked to athletic
success, but the Soviets were apparently obligated by their U.S. policy to be complimentary of
their hosts. Another such article, by one of Russia’s most popular writers, lauded American
sportsmanship. He wrote in the Communist newspaper Pravda, “Never has this part of the earth
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been so excitingly beautiful as now,” because of the “wonderfully sunny atmosphere of
friendship which seems more pure than mountain air.”58
More important than the Russian’s effusive words for American sportsmanship, however,
was his puzzlement “‘over terrible roars from throngs of spectators’ when a contestant, no matter
what nation he came from, happened to beat a Russian.”59 One can imagine the joy in the
partisan American crowd when a Soviet came down the mountain behind even an Austrian, or
crossed the speed skating finish line after a Canadian, and especially when he fell short to the
American hockey team. The Soviet Union was at this time making a concerted effort at
conciliation, and the Americans generally reciprocated that sentiment, but all diplomatic
posturing aside, Americans wanted Soviets to lose. In anything—athletics, industry, aerospace
technology, The Cold War.
The relative lack of politicization surrounding the 1960 Squaw Valley Olympics is not
surprising given the political climate leading to their open. Any matchup of Communism versus
capitalism during the Cold War was sure to stir emotion in contestants and onlookers alike, but
the Soviet Union’s efforts at mitigating tensions from 1956 or 1957 onward, and the United
States’ reciprocal behavior in kind, greatly decreased the temptation for the media and public to
sensationalize these matchups at the Games. The media did indeed draw attention to ideological
differences between the powers, but often implicitly, while the athletes on each side of the
Curtain viewed their ideological and athletic opponents more as the latter, creating an
environment closer to friendly competition than political and military rivalry. Despite the
increasing license taken on definitions of amateurism at the time, the 1960 Games may actually
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have been closer to the ancient ideal than contemporary purists assumed. The attitude that the
athletes had toward one another was much different than what the press tacitly showed. It
remains difficult to place the Soviet hockey captain’s actions—aiding his Cold War foe—
anywhere but in the realm of athletic competition. A different Cold War climate may have made
such a gesture impossible, but the late 1950s Soviet attitude allowed for it. Still, his
considerations likely fell harder on athletic competition than on foreign relations matters.
Because the United States defeated Czechoslovakia, the Soviets earned a medal. Had the Czechs
won, Sologubov would have returned home empty-handed. As we have seen, though, his team’s
disappointing bronze medal may have meant everything for national concerns, versus no medal
at all.
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